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Abstract 
Pattern separation (PS) has been defined as a process of reducing overlap between 
similar input patterns to minimize interference amongst stored representations. The 
present article describes this putative PS process from the “representational-
hierarchical” perspective (R-H), which uses a hierarchical continuum instead of a 
cognitive modular processing framework to describe the organisation of the ventral 
visual-perirhinal-hippocampal processing stream. Instead of trying to map psychological 
constructs onto anatomical modules in the brain, the R-H model suggests that the 
function of brain regions depends upon what representations they contain. We begin by 
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discussing a main principle of the R-H framework, the resolution of “ambiguity” of lower 
level representations via the formation of unique conjunctive representations in higher 
level areas, and how this process is remarkably similar to definitions of PS. Work from 
several species and experimental approaches suggest that this principle of resolution of 
ambiguity via conjunctive representations has considerable explanatory power, leads to 
wide possibilities for experimentation, and also some perhaps surprising conclusions.  
 
Introduction 
The importance of complex conjunctive representations for the resolution of ambiguity in 
lower-level representations is a major focus for our research as well as others. Much 
work from several species and experimental approaches suggests that this principle of 
resolution of ambiguity via conjunctive representations has considerable explanatory 
power, particularly regarding how best to understand the effects of focal brain 
dysfunction (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Lee et al., 2005a,b; Barense et al., 2005; 
Graham et al., 2006; Cowell et al., 2006; Bartko et al., 2007; McTighe et al., 2010; 
Cowell et al., 2010a; Barense et al., 2012; Lee & Rudebeck, 2010). We have referred to 
this way of thinking about brain organisation as  the “representational-hierarchical” 
perspective (R-H) (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Bussey & Saksida, 2005; Saksida & 
Bussey, 2010; Murray, Bussey & Saksida, 2007). 
 
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in a process referred to as “Pattern 
Separation” (PS). PS has been defined as “… reducing interference among similar 
inputs by using non-overlapping representations…” (e.g., Reagh et al., 2014) and “…the 
ability of the network to reduce the overlap between similar input patterns before they 
are stored in order to reduce the probability of interference…” (Neunuebel & Knierim, 
2014). Clearly the main principle of the R-H framework, the resolution of the “ambiguity” 
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of lower level representations, via the formation of unique conjunctive representations in 
higher level areas, is a strikingly similar idea to the above conceptions of PS.  The 
present article is, therefore, aimed at researchers interested in PS, and explores the 
question: To the extent that researchers are interested in PS because it results in the 
formation of new, interference-reducing representations, what insights into PS might be 
offered by considering some of the conclusions resulting from R-H theory?  
 
A quick word about the scope and aims of this opinion piece. R-H theory grew out of an 
interest in the functional relevance of processes and representational content in the 
brain. That is, what such processes and representational content do for us, in aspects of 
cognition such as memory and perception. The way to determine this is through 
empirical, causal behavioural experiments that measure cognition. Non-empirical 
approaches such as computational modeling have been hugely important in the area of 
PS (O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994; Rolls, 1987; 1989; 1990; Treves & Rolls, 1994; 
Norman & O’Reilly 2003; Rolls & Kesner, 2006) and indeed, experiments testing the R-H 
view have been guided by computational modeling (e.g., Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 
2006; Bartko et al., 2007; Barense et al., 2012). But we must remember these are 
models, and at some point experiments on real brains must be done. Correlational 
experimental approaches, particularly electrophysiology, have shed much light on PS at 
the cellular and network levels (e.g., Neunuebel & Knierim, 2013, 2016 this issue), and 
focus on PS as a specific mechanism involving the transformation of an input 
representation to an output representation, in which the output is less correlated than the 
input (in line with computational models). However this process is of interest because of 
the representations thus formed and in particular their relevance to cognition (usually 
memory). Correlational approaches generally do not address this relevance. 
Additionally, correlational approaches have largely focussed on the hippocampus, 
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whereas a main aim of what follows below is a suggestion that we need to consider 
other areas of the brain with respect to PS. Fully understanding any function of the brain 
cannot be accomplished by any single method alone, but requires converging, 
complementary approaches. 
 
Furthermore, our focus in this article is the relevance to cognition of the result of 
processes such as PS, i.e., the representations that are formed from such processes. 
We will not, in this review, discuss how these representations are formed. For example, 
we will consider that such representations may be housed in the ventral visual stream, 
but not, the way the formation of such representations might be related to the receptive 
fields of neurons. Comprehensive treatments of such issues, along with the properties of 
such representations (e.g., invariance), can be found in other sources such as Rolls 
(2016; this issue). 
 Insofar as PS can be considered to be a process of forming new representations 
that help resolve ambiguity, the results of experiments carried out under the auspices of 
R-H theory lead us to offer a number of possibly surprising hypotheses about PS, 
including: 
1. PS is fundamental to many aspects of cognition including perception; it is not just 
for memory. 
2. PS happens in many cortical regions, not just the hippocampus.  
3. PS happens for all stimulus material and not just ‘spatial’ or ‘episodic’ material. It 
happens for different types of representations, in the different regions and 
different levels throughout the “representational hierarchy”.  
4. The dentate gyrus (DG) is unlikely to maintain all levels of representation, and 
thus is not a truly domain-general pattern separator. 
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5. PS – insofar as this term equates with the formation of interference-reducing 
conjunctive representations – may have much wider explanatory power for 
understanding the effects of brain dysfunction than previously suspected. 
 
Below we provide a brief history and summary of R-H theory, with special emphasis 
on these particular conclusions regarding PS, and then return to these points. 
 
The Representational-Hierarchical model: A brief history and summary 
 
The R-H view was first presented in 1998 (Saksida & Bussey, 1998) and discussed 
in a review article in 1999 (Murray & Bussey 1999). Eventually the first modeling and 
experimental studies testing the theory were published (Bussey & Saksida, 2002; 
Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; 2003). Although R-H takes a broad view of cognition, 
initial studies focused on visual cognition, and in particular the issue of whether there are 
dedicated, anatomically segregated memory (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991) and 
perceptual representation (Schacter & Tulving, 1994) systems in the brain. Initial 
experimental studies focused on perirhinal cortex (PRh) as a “testing ground” at the 
anatomical interface between putative memory and perceptual systems. Other authors 
published similar ideas (e.g., Buckley & Gaffan, 1998; Gaffan, 2002) around this time 
and since (e.g., Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010; Nadel & Peterson, 2013). 
Our approach was to try to understand impairments in visual cognition following focal 
brain dysfunction. The prevailing view was that such impairments could be understood in 
terms of damage to a processing module specialized for a particular aspect of cognition 
(Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). In contrast to such a modular 
view, R-H theory proposed that representations are organized in a hierarchical 
continuum and are useful for all aspects of cognition that require them, including 
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memory and perceptual discrimination [indeed we initially referred to this idea as the 
“Perceptual-Mnemonic/ Feature-Conjunction” model (Bussey & Saksida, 2002)]. Thus, 
R-H emphasizes content rather than processing. The strongest version of the view is 
that there are no substantive processing differences within these various regions, and 
effects of brain dysfunction can be understood entirely on the basis of content (see 
Forwood et al., 2012). Although this very strong version of the view is unlikely to be 
entirely correct, it is perhaps surprising just how much it has been able to explain, 
without having to invoke putative differences in processing.   
The basic idea of the R-H view is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. R-H applied to visual cognition (adapted from McTighe et al., 2010). As 
representations pass through regions of the visual ventral stream (VVS) and into the 
medial temporal lobe, they become increasingly more complex in a hierarchical fashion. 
Representations supported by caudal regions represent “features” (e.g. A, B, C and D), 
whilst representations supported by more rostral regions represent conjunctions of those 
features (eventually leading to a representation at the level of a whole object-level 
representation (ABCD) in PRh and spatial and contextual representations in the 
hippocampus). The traditional multiple memory systems view suggests that structures 
within the medial temporal lobe subserve exclusively (declarative) mnemonic function, 
whereas structures in the ventral visual stream are important for, e.g., perceptual 
discrimination. In contrast, the representational-hierarchical view suggests that stimulus 
representations throughout the ventral-visual-perirhinal-hippocampal stream are useful 
for any cognitive function that requires them.  
 
To summarize a few key principles of R-H theory: 
1. R-H emphasizes content, rather than process. 
2. R-H assumes there is no ‘configural’ or ‘conjunctive’ region of the brain; each 
area contains conjunctive representations at different levels of complexity. 
3. These conjunctive representations have the property that “the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts” (see Desimone et al., 1984; Gross, 2008; 
Baker, Behrmann, & Olson, 2002; Erez et al., 2015; cf Sripati & Olson, 2010). 
4. Lesions in particular brain regions disrupt performance on tasks for which the 
representation contained within the region are useful – irrespective of what 
putative cognitive processing function has been used to label the task. These 
labels for tasks usually come out of the implicit or explicit assumption of 
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processing modules, which the tasks are designed to tap. R-H proposes 
there are no such modules.  
5. Higher-level conjunctive representations help to disambiguate the 
behavioural significance of lower-level representations. Lower-level 
representations of, say, individual visual features are likely to occur across 
many objects or situations. Each of these features is therefore likely to be 
associated with different outcomes when part of different objects or events, 
creating ambiguity. Higher-level, more unique conjunctive representations are 
less likely to occur across many objects or events and can therefore help to 
disambiguate the individual features. 
   
This last point is critical for explaining the effects of brain dysfunction on cognition, 
and where the concept of PS might fit into R-H theory. To illustrate, let’s use our early 
experiments on the PRh. Following the standard model of VVS organization (Desimone 
& Ungerleider, 1989; Tanaka, 1996; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999), we assumed that the 
PRh holds object-level representations, whereas feature-level representations are held 
in more caudal regions of the stream (Bussey & Saksida, 2002). The model further 
assumed a high degree of specificity of the representations in PRh (the idea that ‘the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts’), an assumption that has now been supported 
by electrophysiological and imaging studies (Baker, Behrmann, & Olson, 2002; Erez et 
al., 2015). Indeed, other studies have since confirmed the existence of highly specific 
complex visual representations throughout the MTL (Quiroga et al., 2005; 2008). These 
specific complex conjunctive representations prevent the subject from having to rely only 
on simple feature representations (i.e., isolated parts of stimuli) in upstream areas when 
solving tasks such as visual discriminations. This is important when individual features 
are not sufficient to solve a problem.  For example, subjects with damage in PRh are 
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impaired on tasks when features reoccur in both rewarded and non-rewarded objects. 
Thus complex conjunctive representations resolve feature ambiguity in lower-level 
representations – a concept strikingly similar to the notion of PS as  “…reducing 
interference among similar inputs by using non-overlapping representations…” (e.g., 
Reagh et al., 2014)  
We and others have used many different tasks to manipulate feature ambiguity (and 
thereby the requirement for PS), including versions of the biconditional discrimination 
(Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; Barense et al., 2005; Bartko et al., 2007) and 
morphing stimuli together to increase similarity (Bussey, Saksida & Murray, 2002; 
Barense et al., 2005; Bartko et al., 2007). Figure 2 depicts three conditions of a 
concurrent pair-wise discrimination task as an example of the use of biconditional 
discrimination and its variants to manipulate feature ambiguity. Each set of 
discriminations show bugs comprised of two features: legs and body plan (represented 
in Figure 2 using a distinct letter for each feature). When ambiguity is minimal (left 
column), the discrimination can be solved based on a single feature alone. For example, 
body plan A is always correct, whilst body plan E is never correct.  This is true of all 
individual body plans and leg configurations. When there is maximum ambiguity (right 
column), all individual features are rewarded equally often, but conjunctions of those 
features are selectively rewarded. For example, body plan A is rewarded when paired 
with leg configuration B but not with leg configuration D, whilst body plan C is rewarded 
when presented with leg configuration D, but not when in combination with leg 
configuration B. However, the combination of body plan A and leg configuration B is 
always rewarded, whilst the conjunction of body plan A and leg configuration D is never 
rewarded. Importantly, the combination of individual features into a conjunctive 
representation is necessary to solve the task in the maximum, but not the minimum 




Figure 2.  Concurrent object discrimination (adapted from Barense et al., 2005) in which 
each stimulus (bug) contains two types of features (legs and body plan). The ambiguity 
level can be manipulated by varying the degree to which the discrimination can be 
solved using single features alone (e.g. always choose A [body plan with four dots] or C 
[body plan with thick stripes] in the minimum condition) or requires the use of 
combinations of features (e.g. always choose AB [body plan with four spots and orange 
legs] or CD [black body plan and yellow legs] in the maximum ambiguity condition).  
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In addition to these initial explorations, the same basic principles have been used to 
explain a number of phenomena; for example: 
1. Impairment in pair-wise visual discriminations following PRh damage. The 
seemingly contradictory findings that some pair-wise visual discriminations 
are impaired following damage to PRh whereas others are not, can be 
explained in terms of feature ambiguity (Bussey & Saksida, 2001; Bussey, 
Saksida, & Murray, 2003; Barense et al., 2005). Pairwise discriminations that 
are highly ambiguous are impaired after PRh damage but if the discrimination 
can be solved on the basis of individual features alone then they are not. 
These experiments and others showed that damage to a structure that is part 
of the putative ‘medial temporal lobe declarative memory system’ (Squire & 
Zola-Morgan, 1991) could impair performance on tasks with no overt 
declarative mnemonic component, indicating that the prevailing view of non-
overlapping memory versus perceptual representations systems could not be 
correct (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Lee et al., 2005b; Barense et al., 
2005; Graham et al., 2006; Cowell et al., 2006; Bartko et al., 2007; McTighe 
et al., 2010; Cowell et al., 2010a; Barense et al., 2012; Lee & Rudebeck, 
2010). 
2. Increased susceptibility to interference following PRh damage. The model 
predicted that disruption of the representations of high-level conjunctive 
representations in PRh would lead the system to be highly susceptible to 
interference from lower-level feature representations. This was confirmed 
experimentally in rats by Bartko and colleagues (2010) and later shown in 
humans with amnesia by Barense and colleagues (2012). 
3. Delay-dependent impairments following PRh damage. The model produces 
delay-dependent forgetting as a result of interference from stimulus input 
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during the delay in a memory task. For example, delay-dependent 
impairments after PRh damage result from the lack of conjunctive 
representations to resolve the ambiguity of the simpler representations of 
lower-level regions that are more likely to be encountered during the delay 
(Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 2006). 
4. False recognition following PRh damage. The above mechanism made the 
counterintuitive prediction that impairment in object recognition after PRh 
dysfunction may not be due to forgetting per se, but to false recognition (due 
to interference), which was confirmed experimentally (McTighe et al., 2010) 
and later observed in AD mice and aged rats (Romberg et al., 2012; Burke et 
al., 2010) and humans (Yeung et al., 2013). 
5. Amnesia may best be understood as a deficit of encoding, consolidation and 
retrieval. There is a classic debate over whether the primary deficit in 
amnesia is one of encoding (i.e., conversion of incoming information into a 
representation in the brain), storage/consolidation, or retrieval (i.e., the ability 
to access previously stored information; Butters & Cermak, 1980; Kopelman, 
2002; Meudell & Mayes, 1982; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970). R-H 
suggests that brain damage can, at least with respect to object recognition, 
affect all three (Bartko et al., 2010; Saksida & Bussey, 2010). An object, once 
encoded, is represented throughout the VVS. However, damage to medial 
temporal lobe regions such as PRh, as occurs in amnesia, affects only part of 
the representation of that object. Thus, although the complex conjunctive 
representation of the object is compromised, lower-level representations of 
the individual features that make up the object remain intact. Damage in 
rostral regions therefore affect both encoding and storage because the 
complex stimulus representations, normally maintained in rostral regions and 
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that are important for the resolution of interference, cannot be formed or 
stored. Retrieval is also affected because there is competition between the 
remaining feature representations when individual features are shared 
between interfering and novel stimuli. Consistent with this interpretation, 
temporary dysfunction of PRh impairs object recognition during encoding 
(study phase), storage/consolidation (delay phase), or retrieval (test phase) 
(Winters et al., 2007; Winters & Bussey, 2005), and similar findings have 
been reported in hippocampus (Riedel et al., 1999). Note this account 
diverges sharply from the usual approach, which is to understand amnesia as 
due to damage to a processing module specialized for a specific type of 
cognition (memory).  
6. Double dissociations of brain lesions do not force an explanation in terms of 
modularity. An extended version of the model showed that the double 
dissociations in monkeysʼ visual discrimination performance following lesions 
to different regions of the visual hierarchy–usually interpreted as evidence for 
the modularity of visual perception and visual memory—could be accounted 
for by compromised representations within a hierarchical representational 
continuum rather than impairment in a specific type of learning, memory, or 
perception (Cowell et al., 2010a; also see Plaut, 1995). 
7. The representational hierarchy extends at least as far as the DG of the 
hippocampus. The hippocampus is thought to contain higher-level 
representations than representations in PRh, consistent with relational, 
cognitive map, or episodic views of hippocampus function, and thus might be 
thought of as the apex of the representational hierarchy we are considering 
(Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). Although our work 
has not yet extended to the entorhinal cortex (EC), it seems reasonable to 
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speculate that EC supports intermediate-level representations given its 
anatomical position connecting the PRh to the hippocampus (i.e. that it 
maintains representations that are of greater complexity than those of PRh, 
but of lower complexity than those of the hippocampus). This is supported by 
recent electrophysiological evidence indicating that lateral EC supports the 
processing of information about individual objects and locations based on a 
local reference frame (i.e. spatial cues in close physical proximity to the 
individual), whilst the grid-cell populated medial EC supports global (distal 
spatial cues) reference frames (Neuneubel et al., 2013). Consistent with the 
non-modular nature of R-H, the hippocampus was shown to be involved in 
perceptual discriminations (Lee et al., 2005b; 2006; 2007; 2008) and other 
“non-declarative” tasks (Graham et al., 2006; Chen & Phelps, 1999), as long 
as the representation required for the task was higher-level, at the level of 
places or contexts. We explained how this view can account for the effects of 
hippocampus lesions on “recency memory” in terms of the resolution of object 
ambiguity by higher-level hippocampal representations – without having to 
assume the hippocampus is a module specialized for processing “recency 
memory” (Cowell et al., 2006). Furthermore, we have suggested that 
evidence taken to support the existence of “familiarity” or “recollection” 
processing modules in the PRh and hippocampus, respectively, may be 
equally compatible with the R-H content-based view (Cowell et al., 2010b).  
 
What does any of this have to do with PS? 
 
The relevance of R-H principles to PS is that all of the above and more can be 
explained by the formation of highly discriminable representations that resolve 
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interference or ambiguity, which is thought to be the function of PS (see definitions 
above). This suggests that PS is a rather powerful process that happens in many parts 
of the brain, and may be a major player in many aspects of cognition.  
It is worth taking a moment to focus on the last point above, the proposal that the 
hippocampus is an equal partner with other structures within the representational 
hierarchy, in which all structures perform PS. Although the role of many different 
structures in PS has been emphasized by Kesner and his colleagues (e.g., Gilbert & 
Kesner, 2002;2003; Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001; Hunsaker & Kesner, 2013), most 
computational theories have tended to emphasize the hippocampus—and particularly 
the DG—in PS (e.g., Rolls 1989, 1990; Treves & Rolls, 1994; Norman & O’Reilly 2003). 
After Marr (1971), these models usually regard the CA3 region of the hippocampus as 
an auto-associator that can retrieve full memories from partial cues, thereby making it 
essential for retrieval of episodic memories. According to these models, to operate 
efficiently and avoid interference, auto-associators require non-overlapping inputs. 
Because of its various physiological and anatomical properties, the prime candidate for a 
region that could reduce the overlap in inputs to CA3 is DG. However, rather than 
assuming that DG is but one region that may contribute to PS of inputs to CA3, these 
theories often make the assumption or claim that the hippocampus implements PS 
whereas the cortex does not (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Norman, 2010) or indeed that 
PS is the fundamental key to understanding the differences in the roles of the 
hippocampus versus the cortex in memory (Rolls, 2015). As a consequence, the vast 
majority of the work on PS is focused on the hippocampus. Furthermore, a particular 
population of hippocampal neurons – the immature adult-born neurons in DG – has been 
repeatedly implicated in PS (Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001; McHugh et al., 2007; Leutgeb 
et al., 2007; Bakker et al., 2008; Hunsaker, Rosenberg, & Kesner, 2008; Clelland et al., 
2009; Creer et al., 2010; Sahay et al., 2011; Nakashiba et al., 2012; Tronel et al., 2012; 
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Kheirbek et al., 2012; Lee & Solivan, 2010; Bekinschtein et al., 2014; Neunuebel & 
Knierim, 2014). Such findings have led to the suggestion that the DG is a universal 
pattern separator that is ‘domain agnostic’ (Yassa & Stark 2011; Azab et al., 2014). 
However these authors also acknowledge the evidence outlined above that PS happens 
in many brain regions and for many cognitive processes, for example in PRh at the level 
of objects. What is not clear to us is how the same inputs—e.g., objects—could be 
separated twice, once in, say, PRh and then again in the hippocampus. This needs to be 
explained. Furthermore, tasks such as those described above designed to test the 
necessity of ‘pattern-separated’ conjunctive object representations in PRh are 
completely unaffected, or even enhanced, by hippocampus lesions (Saksida et al., 2006; 
2007; Kesner et al., 2015), showing that DG cannot be a domain-general pattern 
separator. 
Furthermore these authors and others discuss DG-mediated PS as being exclusively 
for memory. As we have seen, however, ‘pattern-separated’ object-level representations 
in PRh are not only important for memory; they are important for perceptual 
discrimination, amongst other functions. The view that PS must be ‘for’ a particular 
cognitive function follows from the (we believe incorrect) assumption of cognitive 
modularity. If one assumes that brain regions are specialized cognitive processing 
modules, then the PS that happens there must be ‘for’ that cognitive function and no 
other. Thus if one thinks the hippocampus is specialized for memory, then PS in the DG 
must be for memory. The R-H view is non-modular, and under this view PS can be for 
any cognitive process, not just memory.  
Finally, we note that the apparent involvement of adult-born neurons in the DG in PS 
presents a challenge to the present view, namely: if PS happens in many regions where 
there is no neurogenesis, why are these new neurons necessary for PS only in the DG? 
One possibility is that complex, information-rich representations in the hippocampus, 
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which in the case of episodic memory or one-trial contextual learning must be learned 
extremely rapidly, require the ultra-responsive, highly plastic new neurons in DG. But 
this idea is speculative. Furthermore, you may have noticed that we are now suggesting 
the possibility of different processing in one specific region of the hierarchy. Perhaps this 
is where the strong version of R-H, which claims that all can be explained by content 
without invoking differences in process, breaks down. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
To recap, the main points arising from this analysis are: 
1. PS is fundamental to many aspects of cognition including perception; it is not just 
for memory. 
2. PS happens in many cortical regions, not just the hippocampus. 
3. PS happens for all stimulus material and not just ‘spatial’ or ‘episodic’ material. It 
happens for different types of representations, in the different regions and 
different levels throughout the hierarchy.  
4. The DG is unlikely to maintain all levels of representation, so is not a domain-general 
pattern separator. 
5. PS – insofar as this term equates with the formation of interference-reducing 
conjunctive representations – may have much wider explanatory power for 
understanding the effects of brain dysfunction than previously suspected. 
Thus, considering PS from within the R-H perspective leads us to think about PS in a 
way that diverges from the typical understanding. Moreover, it makes some predictions 
and opens up wide possibilities for experimentation beyond the simple discrimination 
paradigms that are used in the majority of studies. For example, ‘pattern-separated’ 
representations in the DG should be important, not just for spatial/contextual memory, 
but for spatial/contextual analogues of the many object tasks that have been shown to 
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be dependent upon PRh, some of which are mentioned above (e.g., Kesner et al., 
2015). 
Consideration of the R-H view of brain organization might also change the way 
researchers interpret the results of their studies. The most salient example, perhaps, is 
the need to consider the level of representation thought to be housed in the brain region 
one is considering. This means that the choice of stimuli used in experiments becomes 
critical. For example, if PRh is found not to be involved in PS for locations/places, that 
does not mean it is not important for PS at all. It is -- for object-level representations and 
stimuli. Similarly, if hippocampal dysfunction does not affect tasks for which object-level 
conjunctive representations are necessary (it doesn’t; e.g., Saksida et al.,2006; 2007; 
Kesner et al., 2015), that does not mean it is not important for PS. It is --  for location-
level representations.  This principle is as true for PS as is it for any other aspect of 
cognition, yet it continues to surprise us how often the assumptions of the cognitive 
processing module view lead researchers to think the choice of stimulus material in their 
experiments is irrelevant.  
As another example, studies have tended to pit against one another tasks or 
cognitive abilities that according to R-H theory are underpinned by the same 
mechanism: the resolution of ambiguity (or interference) by conjunctive representations. 
For example in the area of neurogenesis, some researchers have asked: Does 
neurogenesis affect PS (discrimination at the behavioural level) or reduction of 
interference in memory? With our PRh work we have shown how the same conjunctive 
representations are useful for both discrimination and reduction of interference in 
memory. The same can be said of many aspects of cognition – including the persistence 
of memory -- as explained above. Consideration of R-H, therefore, might lead 
researchers studying PS to frame their questions in a different way. 
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As a final example of the way consideration of R-H theory might lead researchers to 
design and interpret their studies differently, consider the case for separate types of PS; 
one for memory (reliant on the hippocampus), and another for perceptual discrimination. 
Hunsaker and Kesner (2013), for example, emphasize the importance of the ventral 
hippocampus in PS for memory of odors, but not perception, citing a study by Kesner et 
al. (2011) showing that ventral hippocampus lesions spared pair-wise discrimination of 
similar odors, but impaired discrimination of even relatively dissimilar odors when a 
delay was imposed. However, as described above, Cowell et al. (2006) showed how 
conjunctive representations resolving interference can explain delay-dependent deficits 
(and the predictions of that model have been borne out in a number of experiments; e.g. 
Barko et al., 2007; McTighe et al., 2010). The representations that do this are neither 
exclusively ‘perceptual’, nor ‘mnemonic’; they are useful for all kinds of tasks that we 
refer to as tests of ‘perception’, ‘memory’, ‘categorization’, or whatever. Indeed on this 
view, we would predict that a lesion that compromised such conjunctive representations 
could generate exactly the pattern observed by Kesner et al. (2011): less similarity is 
required to produce a deficit when the task is combined with a delay that is also 
increasing the load on PS. Therefore from the perspective of R-H, it is not just that 
Kesner and colleague’s conclusion that their results indicate ‘mnemonic’ but not 
‘perceptual’ PS is unwarranted, it is that it is the wrong question to begin with, assuming 
as it does separate perceptual and mnemonic modules in the brain. However given that 
assumption, these authors approached it experimentally in the right way – by using tasks 
thought to tap these different assumed systems; often the conclusion that the, say, 
hippocampus is involved in pattern separation for memory only, comes from nothing 
more than the assumption that the hippocampus does memory and nothing else (which 
we believe to be incorrect (Lee et al., 2005ab; Zeidman, Mullally, & Maguire, 2014). 
Furthermore the foregoing analysis underscores the need for evidence for PS to come 
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from several levels of discriminability in a task where all other factors (such as delay) are 
held constant, and an interaction between group and discriminability obtained. Many 
studies on PS have not met this basic requirement, using on a single level of 
discriminability. Kesner et al. (2011) used four levels in the delay task. However all 
separations were impaired, thus providing little evidence for a role for the hippocampus 
in odor PS. 
As a final comment, our work has focused almost exclusively on vision and the 
hierarchical organization of the VVS leading into the PRh and through to the 
hippocampus, but it is almost certainly the case that all of these considerations extend to 
modalities other than vision., Modalities begin to converge in the PRh; indeed there is 
some evidence for impaired tactile PS following lesions in this region (Ramos, 2014). 
However, representations in many unimodal areas are likely to be organized in this way, 
and the principles of conjunctive representations/ambiguity and PS would therefore 
apply equally to these other modalities.  For example, the dorsal and ventral auditory 
processing streams appear to be hierarchically organised (Warren, Wise, & Warren, 
2005; Rauschecker & Scott, 2009): the representations of specific speech sounds are 
encoded in posterior regions such as mid superior temporal gyrus (STG), whilst 
representations of the meaning of speech are represented in more anterior parts of the 
STG (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009). PS – as defined above --may be happening 
throughout many brain systems. 
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